CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

Present State of AFFAIRS,

WITH SOME

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

DUTCH OBSERVATOR.

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ERRATA.

P. 10. l. 6. For *flowers*, read *artificial flowers*.
P. 11. l. 22. For *two*, read *too*.
P. 35. l. 8. For *the Province*, read *that Province*.

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

Preſent State of Affairs, &c.

HOWEVER opinions may be divided and diſtracted, concerning the Public affairs, there ſeems to be one point, in which it is hard to think they are not all perfectly united, and that is, the conſidering the preſent period, as the moſt inglorious and dangerous one, that Britain has for many ages, or perhaps ever, known.

AT ſuch a juncture then, it is not eaſy to conceive, that a greater ſervice can be offered to the Public, than a fair attempt to lay the truth of things before it, rather, however, by way of

enabling it to form its own judgment, than of preſuming to direct it.

To this great, this ſalutary purpoſe, as nothing however can be more conducive than a ſtrict regard for truth, than which no virtue is ſo much preached, or ſo little practiſed; ſo on the candideſt review of the preſent political writers, muſt it be confeſſed, that truth has not greater enemies, than two parties, who, tho' directly oppoſite to each other, equally concur to obſcure its light, by their reſpective prejudices, paſſions, and intereſts.

The one conſiſting of perſons attached to Power, by motives of intereſt, either preſent, or in expectancy, officiouſly labors to make their court to the miniſtry, by defending it without reſerve, by pleading a good intention, in favor of its meaſures, when the ill conſequences of them cannot be denied, and by eluding, as well as they can, that concluſion of common ſenſe, againſt its being poſſible that ſuch a number of calamities and loſſes, aggravated by ſuch circumſtances of ignominy, could have happened, if the perſons in charge with

with the Britiſh ſyſtem, had been equal to that truſt.

The other party again offers to the view a motley aſſemblage of perſons, who make a war of invectives againſt the miniſtry, either from motives of reſentment for rejected claims, or in the hopes of acquiring, by railing at it, a popularity, formidable enough for them to be taken off, a ſcheme, which ſtale and hackneyed as it is, has not for all that but afforded recently enough, ſome encouraging examples. As to thoſe, however numerous they may be, who have no other aim but the wretched produce of their wretched performances, the art of which rarely reaches beyond that of a temporizing, taking title, they form rather too contemptible a diviſion to deſerve mention. They are oftener, in every ſenſe, objects of pity, than of any other notice.

As both theſe parties then agree in the ſacrifice, or in the perverſion of truth, to their reſpective ends, there is alſo a ſtale artifice frequently employed by both, of ſetting out with great profeſſions of candor and moderation, the meaning of which is to eſtabliſh a

confidence in the reader, in order only to abuſe it.

Yet from the colliſion of the different opinions on both ſides, there has ſometimes been ſtruck a light, favorable even to that truth, their paſſions and intereſts were otherwiſe ſo fit to darken. Falſehood then, never but weak, and unguarded in one part or other, has often paid an involuntary, and conſequently an unmeritorious homage to Truth. Thus a profeſt defence of the miniſtry, has often ſerved only to expoſe it: and the manner, heat and diſorder of an attack upon it, has only unmaſked the pretext of it. So unſuppreſſive is truth, and ſuch its power, even over its enemies.

But ſurely the indignation of the Public muſt be kindled beyond its being poſſible to receive an addition at ſuch as ſhould mix any little ſelfiſh, or party views, with their repreſentations, on a criſis like the preſent one, when nothing leſs than its deareſt and moſt ſacred intereſts are palpably at ſtake, and when ſo much depends on the whole community's having ſuch a fair view of the nature and

cauſes

cauſes of its danger, as may excite and generalize an enlightened zeal, for ſaving the nation, before it may be yet too late to attempt it. On this occaſion to be of any party, but that of one's country, muſt be at once the height of folly, and the height of treaſon. Neither perſons or things, can now deſerve the public attention, but ſo far as they relate to the retrieval of the public affairs. All internal diviſions, all little paſſions of revenge, or intereſt, cannot conſiſtently with the ſafety of the nation, but yield to that great common cauſe of union againſt the French king, who after having rent from us a limb, the acute feelings of pain for which, are rather exaſperated than abated by reflexion, will hardly ſtop or give us breathing time, before he purſues his ſtroke at the vitals of Britain.

With not leſs power than Lewis XIV. the policy of this Lewis is ten times more dangerous, from the greater art with which he accompanies it. Lewis XIV. with equally bad deſigns againſt the liberties of Europe, rouz'd and drove all its powers into leagues againſt him, by the open inſolence with which he treated them. His bombardment of Genoa,

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devaſtations of the Palatinate, with many other inſults on the Germanic body, beſides other violences and airs of haughtineſs ſhewn to other princes, alarmed, in time, the nations concerned, to reduce his exorbitant power within its proper bounds; and this mighty invader of the ſafety and quiet of Europe, at laſt eſcaped himſelf being cruſhed, only under favor of that contempt, into which his weakneſs had brought him.

But the preſent French king, either better adviſed, or wiſer by the example of his predeceſſor, plays an infinitely more ſecure game, by the care he takes to cover it. It was under all the endearing profeſſions of moderation, and love of peace, that he perfidiouſly broke the pragmatic ſanction, and would have extirpated the weak remains of the houſe of Auſtria, which then found ſo powerful a ſupport in this nation, as poſſibly preſerved its very exiſtence. It was, under the color of the pureſt diſintereſtedneſs, that he gave that roundneſs to his dominions, in the adjunction of Lorrain to them, favored by the unaccountably ſupine acquieſcenſe of Britain, and of a miniſter, lulled to ſleep by the cardinal Fleury,

and

and too buſy in corrupting his countrymen to pay a due attention to foreign affairs, of which he was alſo ſhamefully ignorant.

Thus then the French Court, adopting a more refined ſyſtem, proceeded eſtabliſhing its influence over all the powers of Europe, on whoſe eyes it has ſo ſucceſsfully ſhed its political poppies, that they bid fair not to open them, or to wake, but in chains.

But the triumph of the French politics, is in their management of Holland, by ſeducing and fomenting the Commonwealth, or rather Anti-ſtadtholderian Party, which, looking on the revival of that great office, as an abridgment of its power, cloſed eagerly with the French faction, who perſuaded its members, that the influence of England had operated that event, and renewed that form of government, againſt which they had been ſo many years taking precautionary meaſures. The French then labored, and too ſucceſsfully labored the point, of raiſing a jealouſy in the leaders of that party againſt the Engliſh meaſures, and of ſowing ſeeds of diviſion between two nations, the union of which, from their conformity

formity of religion, and love of liberty, might have formed ſo ſtrong a barrier againſt their ambitious views. For the ſervice then of the French, Van Haren either ſold to, or ſeduced by them, exhauſted all the powers of his eloquence, which had he either known, or been zealous for the true intereſts of his country, would have been better employed, in oppoſing the French artifices, and in cementing the cloſeſt confederacy between our nation, and his. To his taſk however ſucceeded, with more propriety at leaſt, a French negotiator, who, under the perfidious maſk of a Dutchman, publiſhed the moſt inflammatory invectives againſt the Engliſh nation, ſtuffed with the groſſeſt calumnies, the falſeſt imputations, accompanied with the moſt fulſome adulation, directed to that weak ſide of all mankind the love of flattery, not forgetting a due doſe of jealouſy of our commercial rivalſhip. Nay, ſo little has that writer reſpected the common ſenſe of the Dutch, that he has not been afraid of accuſing us to them, of a deſign of ingroſſing an Univerſal Commerce, which is, by the very nature of it, a thouſand times more chimerical, than that of univerſal dominion. Yet, have not theſe writings,

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though full of illuſive ſophiſms, and even eaſily refutable falſities, failed of making impreſſions, not only on the Dutch, but wherever they have been diſperſed, in many of the courts of Europe. There is a ſort of pointedneſs of wit in them, under favor of which, the poiſon of them has enter'd into minds unguarded with an antidote, which perhaps it was not ſo wiſe to neglect the furniſhing. The Dutch, however, blinded by all this duſt thrown into their eyes, do not perceive, that the French flatter them, only becauſe they are ſure of them, that inſtant they have carried their point with us. They embrace them, at preſent, as the reaper does the ſtanding corn he is in act to cut down. But can it be poſſible, that a nation ſo cool, ſo long-ſighted, ſo unuſed to have the change put on it, in matters of intereſt, ſhould not but ſee, that from that inſtant, that France ſhall have put itſelf on the foot of a maritime power, the liberty, the independence of Holland, are no more. Is the neighbourhood of France ſo little known to it, as that it can hope to eſcape the being, ſooner or later, ſwallowed up by it, eſpecially with a French faction almoſt avowedly in its boſom? Can any thing it ever had

to fear from Britain, or even to complain of it, amount to the danger of that gulph of the French ambition, the precipice into which is not the leſs certain, for the French endeavoring to lull it aſleep on that brink of it, they are thus with flowers covering from its ſight? with what impudence, with what contempt of its underſtanding, muſt they repreſent us as more to be dreaded by it, than themſelves, and that the ſuccours it owes us, are not in effect a meaſure of pure ſelf-preſervation?

As to Britain, it is impoſſible to imagine a more perfidious treatment than it has met with from the French, whilſt they had the art of turning appearances againſt us, and by concealing their own provocations, and encroachments, under the falſeſt pretences of juſtice, meekneſs, and endurance, of giving to meaſures purely defenſive, the color of an odious aggreſſion. It is thus that they have imputed to the Engliſh in America, thoſe very points of procedure, of which themſelves were in fact guilty.

The Engliſh had ſcarce began their ſettlement in Acadia, before they experienced the uſual

uſual effects of a French neighbourhood. Their miſſionaries were employed in the holy work, of exciting to rebellion the ſavages ſubordinate to our Government; and with a true Roman-catholic blood-thirſtineſs, encouraged them, under hand, to murder our coloniſts, and to bring in their ſcalps. No art, in ſhort, no treachery did they omit, to render that ſettlement untenable to us; and when they found that we perſevered in the maintenance of territories, ceded to us, by a treaty, which they ought to have remembered with ſome tenderneſs, ſince it ſaved their ſtate, when on the brink of utter ruin; they were not aſhamed of trumping up a diſtinction of names, to ſupplant us in our right, by the meaneſt chicanery, when they found that their open force, on hidden treachery, had equally failed them. But the exiſtence of that colony was too great an eye-ſore to them, not to ſet them on compaſſing the deſtruction of it, by every means they could imagine; and ſince it was two glaring an injuſtice, as well as too great a difficulty to attempt it, in a time of peace, by levelling directly their machinations at Hallifax itſelf, they modeſtly contented themſelves with ſuch pretenſions to the countries dependent

on it, as would reduce it to an abſolute ſtate of inſignificance, or rather ſo as to make it a load than a benefit to this nation. To carry this point then, they had recourſe to ſuch pitiful quirks, ſuch evaſions of a treaty, clear enough, had it been made with any nation but the French, as might ſatisfy any impartial judgment, that they had nothing leſs in view, than juſtice, or good faith.

For a ſample of their reaſoning, take the following one, from one of their ſtaunchеſt advocates. " The Engliſh (ſays this author) you " need not doubt, want to invade the com- " merce of all other nations. Canada, that " barren portion of the new world, which " ſtands its poſſeſſors (the French) in immenſe " ſums, for which it makes no returns but " ſkins, which are purchaſed abundantly too " dear, is not an object capable of exciting " the attention of that nation, or of tempting " its intereſt: what then can be their aim? " *Accipe nunc Danaum inſidias.* This unpro- " fitable country is the bulwark of the iſlands, " from which France draws the riches of its " commerce."

But,

But, thou wretched ſophiſter! cannot there be a much fairer reaſon given for the Engliſh ſupporting their rights to thoſe territories, which are their own property, than any deſigns of encroaching upon Canada? might not the queſtion be more fairly retorted upon them, why do the French ſo obſtinately refuſe us quiet poſſeſſion of our ſettlement bordering upon that barren Canada? their anſwer would be, if they were ſincere, that they want to deſtroy that barrier between them, and the reſt of our poſſeſſions in North America, and which interferes with their long concerted plan of, literally ſpeaking, a circumvention, by forming a chain of dominion, at the back of all our colonies, that ſhould take its ſweep from the mouth of the river of St. Laurent, to that of the Miſſiſippi: a ſweep, which would, beſides expoſing our colonies to their momentary incurſions by themſelves, in time of open war, or by the ſavages, under their influence in that of peace, prove a circumſtance which would reduce the value of our colonies, to leſs than nothing.

But the reaſon they give for their uſurpation, a reaſon which they call title, is even ridiculous,

ridiculous, for being as deſtitute of ſhame, as it is of foundation.

The uſefulneſs, the neceſſity of a communication between Canada, and the Louiſiana, is the ſole juſtification they produce for their invaſion of the intermediate tracts that form it. They abſolutely exhibit no other ſhadow of right, but that of convenience. But is it the fault of the Engliſh, that being in the prior poſſeſſion of the coaſt, that gives them ſo juſt a claim to all the inlands from that coaſt, they ſhould not tamely ſuffer the French encroachments, authorized by no title on earth, but that conveniency, which has however, more than once, ſerved them to vindicate their uſurpations in Europe?

Their advocate is pleaſed to be very witty upon the lines of demarcation, drawn from Eaſt to Weſt, and embracing the tract contained between the North and South parallels, and compare it to the famous line of demarcation, drawn from North to South, by pope Alexander the ſixth. But they muſt have renounced all ſenſe of ſhame, if they do not allow

ſuch

ſuch lines infinitely more founded on nature and right, than thoſe arbitrary boundaries they preſume to ſet us, in that of the Apalachian mountains, to which no treaty, no conſent of ours, nor the common law of nations, with reſpect to ſettlements in America, ever gave color, or authority.

The proper, the univerſally underſtood line of demarcation, from whence the right of poſſeſſion extends, and knows no bounds, can be no other than the ſea-ſide.

When our kings made their conceſſions of thoſe tracts of lands, diſcovered and poſſeſſioned by their ſubjects, it may fairly be appealed to all Europe, whether every Power in it did not underſtand them to extend directly inland, as far as the coloniſts could, or would penetrate. Had the Apalachian mountains been but two, three, or four miles of the ſea, would any one have doubted but the colonies might have extended beyond them, in a direct line from the ſea, and if two, three, or four miles, why not two, three, or four hundred miles? was the French convenience

of

of communication between the Canada and the Louiſiana, ſo much as dreamed of, as a ſtop to their further proceeding inland, as faſt as they had cleared the intermediate tracts? If they before very lately had no occaſion to exert that right, was it the leſs ſuch, for having been ſo long dormant? could that unexertion form any preſcription againſt them, when there was ſo fair a reaſon for it, as their plantations not having yet reached that length, and certainly the ſlower for the great inconvenience of their diſtance from the ſea ports, which was already a great objection to the extenſion of their induſtry to thoſe parts, and to which there would now lye an infinitely greater one, in the pernicious neighbourhood of the French. But ſuppoſing, for argument's ſake, that the Engliſh had not a right as clear as the ſun to thoſe ulterior tracts; what right have the French to them? on what title, on what authority do they call them *their* lands? or how dare they moleſt forts, or eſtabliſhments upon them, as invaſions of their property? what poſſeſſion can they alledge, but that indolent, and to give it perhaps a juſter name, the good-natured toleration of the Engliſh, in ſuffering them to paſs, repaſs, or trade in a

country

country as yet indifferent to them, becauſe as yet unoccupied by them. With what falſity too does the French writer call thoſe tracts, " Ces pays ingrats qui ſont entre les monts " Apalaches, et la riviere Oyo." *Thoſe barren countries between the Apalachian mountains, and the river Ohio.* Whereas the truth is, that they are only the moſt fertile territories in North America, and yield neither in fruitfulneſs or pleaſantneſs, to any of their provinces in France, to Languedoc, or to Provence.

But it would be well worth the Spaniards while to conſider, in time, before they are drawn in to adopt the French quarrel, that the ſame maxims, on which they found their uſurpations, will equally militate againſt themſelves, when once the French ſhould have ſucceeded in deſtroying thoſe boundaries between our ſettlements and theirs; or have they from hiſtory, reaſon, or experience, room to think, that any thing ſhould hinder them from reſpecting as little thoſe limits that ſeparate New Mexico and the Louiſiana? to ſay nothing of the pretenſions they might form on ſuch vaſt territories, as are hitherto unoccupied by the Spaniards, and yet to which the

ſituation determines their title. Can they poſſibly forget, either what good neighbors the French have been to them in Europe, and even in America, in Hiſpaniola eſpecially, where, by means of the neſtling in at firſt of a few French pirates and buccaneers, eſcaped from the rigor of the laws, their countrymen have at length inched the Spaniards out of the better half of that great iſland, and do not promiſe to be content, in time, with leſs than the whole of it.

To aver then, as the French writer does, that the ſtand made by the Engliſh, againſt their encroachments, is other than a purely defenſive one, or that it is the prelude to a deſign of engroſſing univerſal commerce, and this averment addreſſed to the Dutch themſelves, is ſuch an inſult on their underſtandings, as that the French muſt reckon greatly on their paſſiveneſs, as to imagine they would not reſent it; and much leſs ought they to hope, that the Dutch would be influenced by it.

It might be leſs a matter of indignation to Europe, was Europe but well informed of the true grounds of the diſpute, if the French would

would at once fairly own, that, being unwilling to relinquiſh their uſurpation, they would truſt the deciſion of what ought not to have been a queſtion, to the chance of war, than for them thus meanly and perfidiouſly to traduce the Engliſh, as the aggreſſors, or as maintainers of a cauſe of no great ſignificance, compared to the peace of Europe, when, in fact, nothing leſs is at ſtake than the value, and preſervation of their whole poſſeſſions in America, with all the dependences of Britain itſelf on them, the loſs of which to it, and the gain reſulting to France, would, if well conſidered, make many Powers, now at beſt indifferent, and ſome even ſeduced by the French ſophiſtry, not be extremely glad that the balance of Europe, intimately connected with that of America, ſhould receive ſuch a ſhock, or even run the riſk of being thus deſtroyed.

The reader will here be pleaſed to obſerve, that no ſtreſs is laid on the French invaſion of the neutral iſlands, not that they are leſs convictive proofs of the diſreſpect of that nation to public faith, but to avoid the anticlimax

of mentioning them after the two more important objects of Acadia, and the Ohio.

In the mean time, it muſt give every true Engliſhman a ſolid ſatisfaction, to find that nothing can be falſer, than the accuſation brought againſt the people of England in general, for having, on too light an occaſion, clamored the miniſters into a war, which threatens to be ſo ſerious an one. The more the cauſes of it are examined, the more clearly will it appear, that unleſs the whole Britiſh intereſt in America, and how extenſive an one that is, need not be inſiſted on, had been given up to the rapaciouſneſs of the French, a war with them was unavoidable. In vain do they pretend, that the means of negotiation were ſtill left open, and were only cut off by the premature violence of our hoſtilities, which were however evidently no more than the repulſe of a manifeſt aggreſſion, and the prevention of an evil imminently threatened. Nothing can be plainer, than that their fair pretence of an amicable negotiation, of the parade of which they made ſuch an uſe, in the courts of Europe, was merely calculated to lull us off our guard, whilſt they kept conſtantly pouring in freſh ſupplies of men and warlike ſtores

into

into Canada, to enable them to deſtroy at once the Britiſh power in thoſe parts, beginning from Acadia, and carrying the whole line of circumvention from thence down to the Miſſiſippi: whilſt thus maſters of the mid-land territories, the ſea-coaſts were ſure of following their fate, or at leaſt of not being worth further tenure. So that, in fact, the points on which the French were ſo condeſcending to offer this inſidious negotiation, were abſolutely *untreatable* ones, and, in truth, it was even a ſpecies of indignity to propoſe a treaty upon them. Had nothing more been depending than aſcertaining the boundaries of Acadia, the Engliſh might perhaps, for the ſake of peace, have even conſented to any moderate relaxation of their rights, though ſure too, that one conceſſion is only paving the way for another; but when the capital point of litigation was, whether they ſhould, in giving up the whole weſtern limits, virtually give up all America, who does not ſee, that the very propoſal itſelf was ſcarce ſhort of a formal declaration of war, or at leaſt unavoidably led to it?

Among too the many calumnies imputed to the Engliſh, by the *Obſervator*, there is one lamenta-

lamentable tale told of the murther of monſieur Jumonville, in cold blood, by ſome Engliſh officers, near the Ohio, on the 23d of May, 1754, as he was reading his credentials to them: and, no doubt, if the fact was, as it is there related, nothing could be leſs juſtifiable. But the more atrocious the crime is, the clearer ſhould have been the proof given of it: nothing is more likely than that, as he approached with a party of about thirty men, the Engliſh might indiſcreetly, and prematurely fire upon them, and monſieur Jumonville might fall: but it muſt be knowing the Engliſh very little, to ſuppoſe them capable of ſuch an aſſaſſinate, the crime of which could only be exceeded by that of falſely charging them with it. However, that writer takes ſpecial care not to ſay a ſillable of the murther of captain Howe, N. B. before that affair of Jumonville's, invited to a conference with ſome French officers, and as ſoon as it was ended, barbarouſly murdered, by their direction, on his return. Yet, even this notorious fact is not quoted as a juſtification of the other, but to prove the fair dealing of the French, in accuſing the Engliſh of ſpecifically the very enormity they committed themſelves.

With

With much the ſame candor does that writer deſcant on Mr. Shirley's proclamation, of the 28th of June, 1755, appointing a reward for Indians killed, or taken priſoners; but not a word of his countrymen, Miſſionaries of the Goſpel, their exhortations to the ſavages to rebel, and their paying them for every Engliſh ſcalp they brought in: much leſs of one of their governors having, in imitation of the ſavages, put one of them to death, with all the exquiſite tortures he could deviſe. But to ſhew him the difference of the Engliſh candor from his, he may be aſſured, that many Engliſhmen diſapprov'd of Mr. Shirley's procedure in this point, as neither thinking the cruelty and treachery of ſavages, nor of the French, models for an Engliſhman's imitation; and to return him his compliment, which he makes the Indians pay us, "that of all the ſavages "of Europe the Engliſh were the hardeſt to "civilize." he may be pleaſed to take notice, that of all ſavages, the politeſt are often the falſeſt.

Yet this is the writer, whoſe productions have made ſuch a noiſe, and been quoted as unanſwerable, though out of themſelves alone there

there might be collected, without ſtrain, or torture, the fulleſt refutation of them: in ſhort, the whole of them, when reduced to their juſt appraiſement, anſwers the idea one has of French-paſte brilliants, the poliſh of which furniſhes a ſuperficial glitter, without ſolidity, or intrinſic worth.

To give however one more ſpecimen of the reaſoning of this celebrated writer, follows a paſſage tranſlated from him.

" The French became poſſeſſors of the " Ohio (true! but how did they become ſo?) " and were in ſuch ſort the maſters of it in " 1739, that a war with the Chickiſſaws, a " people bordering on the Louiſiana, having " obliged the Governor of Canada to ſend " ſuccors into that country, a French detach- " ment came from New-France in Miſſiſippi, " down the Belle-Riviere (the Ohio) and " marched croſs the whole country, in the " form of an army, without the Engliſh mak- " ing any complaint of this. This ſilence on " their part proves MORE than the moſt AU- " THENTIC titles could do, that they (the " Engliſh) had no PRETENSIONS upon that " country.

" country. If the Ohio had been a part of
" their colonies, would they have permitted
" a foreign force to have deſcended the ſtream
" of it? would they not have complained?
" would they not have made repreſentations?
" what SOVEREIGN would ſuffer thus his
" country to be croſſed by a body of troops,
" that did not even deign to aſk the liberty
" of paſſage thro' it?"

Here the reader has, by a Frenchman's own ſhewing, one of the moſt *authentic* titles their nation has to produce, that is to ſay, taking it upon content, that no complaints or repreſentations were made: the contrary of which does not however appear, though they might not have been ſo effectual, ſo formal, or ſo loud as they ought to have been. But admitting the caſe ſimply, as ſtated by that writer; can the negligence, the indolence, the tameneſs of a governor, or perhaps the ignorance of ſuch a paſſage, in the wild and yet uncolonized parts of his government, until too late to impede it, and thought perhaps too inſignificant to complain of it afterwards, confer any valid title on the French nation, or annul that of the Engliſh one? Is not the

urging ſuch an allegation, downright laughing at mankind? which reminds one of the character given, in the life of Bonoſus by Vopiſcus, to the Franks, from whom the French affect to derive their origin, and cannot at leaſt be ſaid to degenerate from their manners, "Quibus familiare eſt ridendo fidem frangere." However, he is ſo far in the right of laying hold on ſuch a title, as except that of violent ſeizure, and an appeal to the ſword, it is the only one the French have to produce. To do them, however, juſtice, and indeed to draw to a point the object of the preſent diſpute, in North-America, thus it ſtands. The claims of France are of the utmoſt importance to its colonies: the rejecting of them is of the utmoſt importance to Britain: ſo far then they are equal; but Britain has beyond them an undoubted right, which will neither appear begging the queſtion, nor ſtrange to thoſe who know the grounds of it, or who know the French.

In vain then does the French writer ſeek to render the Engliſh odious to Europe, as perturbators of its peace. No one can well blame them for defending thoſe poſſeſſions, not only unconteſtably

unconteſtably their right, but eſſential to the welfare and preſervation of the reſt. In vain would he therefore endeavour to make the diſpute paſs for nothing more, than about a few tracts of land indifferent to them, and kept or claimed merely out of prejudice to the French, or what is more abſurd yet, out of a deſign of engroſſing a univerſal commerce. The Engliſh are, or ought to be, better known in Europe, for the liberty of which, they have often ſhewn as much zeal as for their own; and have been even laviſh of their blood, and treaſures; and, in truth, it is pleaſant enough to mark the French in their new-aſſumed character, of the protectors of thoſe liberties of Europe, which they never yet miſſed an occaſion of invading, againſt the Engliſh, who never miſſed one of defending them.

If to the Engliſh; as their government is in the hands of Men, and conſequently ſuſceptible of errors and fallibility, there may have ſometimes, no doubt, been reproaches juſtly to be made for miſtakes, or miſ-procedure: ſtill thoſe deviations are only tranſient; the ſpirit of the nation, which is that of uni-

verſal liberty, that never goes without equity, is permanent, and ſoon brings back things to their right courſe: whereas that of the French is known to be a reſtleſs ſpirit of domination, nor are they ever more dangerous, nor more to be ſuſpected, than when they ſport ſentiments of moderation, and diſintereſtedneſs, and with a verſatility peculiar to their Proteus-policy, take any form, even that of zeal for liberty, which they deteſt, for themſelves not having it, and would wiſh all mankind as much ſlaves as they are. It is in views like theſe, they declaim againſt a ſtadtholder's power in Holland, to which however they can have no objection, but its conſtitutionally ſtanding in their way, and giving to the Dutch government an old experienced form, that might prevent their being enſlaved by them, enſlaved with the aggravating circumſtance of their deſerving it, for truſting a people, ſcarce ever with impunity, known to have been truſted. They will then probably find that, at a convenient ſeaſon, their turn will come, and their barrier-line be as little reſpected by the French in Europe, as the Engliſh-one has been in America, and they will then remember that thoſe ſuccors we required

of

of them, they owed to us, and to themſelves.

It may however be ſhrewdly aſked, how comes it that a people repreſented, in the deſpicable character of ſlaves (for ſuch the French by the form of their government undoubtedly are) ſhould gain advantages over a land of freemen. But if no anſwer can be given to that queſtion, that is much to the honor of that land of freemen, at leaſt ſuch an one may be attempted, as without impeaching any one, may do juſtice even to our enemies.

The French then, than whom no people on earth are more intereſted, know however their true intereſt too well to ſacrifice every thing to a paultry, momentary pecuniary one; and amidſt all their private follies, ridicules, and vices, have ſtill ſenſe, or indeed ſelf-love enough, to retain public virtue. This is what renders them effective ſubjects: and to be depended on for executing the orders of a court, always tending to its ends, by means well digeſted, and well planned; a court juſtly convinced, that no ſyſtem can be worſe than that of not having one; as well as that no ſyſtem can poſſibly

poſſibly be ſo good, as not to be defeated by committing its execution to improper inſtruments: thence, its exactneſs in diſtinguiſhing them, and in aſſorting, and adapting them to employs according to their various talents, than which no point of government can be of more importance, nor is in many countries leſs underſtood, or more neglected.

But to return from much too long a digreſſion (and for which pardon is accordingly aſked) to the more immediate ſubject: it is plain then, that no war ever entered into by the Britiſh nation, could, more than the preſent one, be averred to be on a purely Britiſh footing. It is not then only a war of juſtice, but of defence, and of the greateſt neceſſity: a war too begun by the French aggreſſion, if actual hoſtilities may be allowed as ſtrong a form of the declaration of one, as only words.

Admiral Boſcawen's capture then of the two French men of war, was not only poſterior to a number of their overt-acts of uſurpation, incurſion and treachery; but the ſhips which fell into his hands were part of a ſquadron, which,

which, to juſtify him it would be enough to obſerve, was appointed to pour in enablements for them to proſecute that plan of deſtruction they had already begun; but it is beſides beyond ſuſpicion that it was intended againſt Hallifax itſelf, if Mr. Boſcawen had not been at hand to cover it; a point which is not in the leaſt falſified by ſome of the ſhips not having their cannon mounted, which was not neceſſary for the operation intended, on their forces being landed. So that, ſurely nothing could be more proper, more regular, more uncavillable than that ſtep of Mr. Boſcawen's, againſt which the French have exclaimed with great injuſtice, and equal indecency.

But as to the meaſure of capturing their innocent merchantmen, before a declaration of war, let thoſe defend it, who adviſed it, or who admire it. In the mean time, the ſeizing ſhips and goods, for the ſake of preventively diſarming France of its ſeamen, and thus making them priſoners of Peace, ſounds rather towards an irregularity and arbitrarineſs, that had perhaps been better avoided by a power which may, and ought to vindicate its dominion on the ſea, but a power

which

which muſt be weakened by any tendency to tyrannize upon it, from the alarm it muſt give Univerſal Society to oppoſe it.

Nor has the Dutch obſervator failed of making the moſt virulent uſe of this theme for declamation, in which, by fixing the attention of the public, unfavorably for Britain on that point, he artfully draws it off from the bottom of the queſtion, to which, however, when that public is brought back by reflexion, it will eaſily diſcover, that the prior hoſtilities of the French on ſhore, before any declaration of war, was at leaſt as informal, and attended with much more aggravating circumſtances, than what the Engliſh continued afterwards at ſea, on the authority of Talion-law, which can hardly be ſaid not to be the law of nations. The ſcene of action on their ſide being more remote and obſcure whilſt thoſe of ours on the open ſea, were more glaring and intereſting to other powers, placed the appearances on the ſurface againſt us, but then they were only appearances. The right at bottom of our procedure was unalterable; and yet it is to be wiſhed that thoſe appearances, ſince the world is ſo apt

to

to form its deciſions on them, and ſo loath to revoke them, had been ſpared, and nothing liable to the leaſt note of foulneſs, mixed with a cauſe ſo fair, as the preſent one of Britain.

But whilſt nothing can be more clearly, more uncavillably demonſtrated, than the juſtice and neceſſity of the war, on our ſide, there ariſes but a melancholic conſideration of the prediſpoſitions towards it, and of the conduct and management of it hitherto.

If the French writer of the Dutch Obſervator ſuggeſts, that the influence of Hanover predominates in the Britiſh Councils; as for example, where he ſays, Letter vi. page 34. " Ce n'eſt pas la France c'eſt l'Allemagne " qu'ils (les Ruſſiens) menacent; et le Roi " d' Angleterre deſtine prudemment les ſub- " ſides de la nation aux alliés de Hanovre." " *It is not France, but Germany, that the Ruſſi-* " *ans threaten, and the K. of E. prudently ap-* " *plies the ſubſidies of the nation to the alli s of* " *the E. of H.*" Such an inſinuation carries its counterpoiſon with it, in the conſideration of its coming from a declared enemy, and ought

not therefore to be received, but for what it deſerves. It is his game, and he plays it accordingly, in ſeeking to ſow the ſeeds of Diſcontent; that by depriving his M——y of his much the moſt precious dominion, that over the hearts of his Britiſh ſubjects, he might, by diſuniting, weaken their power of action againſt the common enemy. For this purpoſe he, in more paſſages than the one above quoted, endeavours to inculcate an opinion of that partiality to H——, which the Engliſh mob, and even many above that order, are but too ready to adopt, from a very natural, and ſurely a very honeſt, laudable, and even loyal jealouſy of any other nation being better loved, by their ſovereign, than their own.

If then ſuch a ſuſpicion is ſo unfavorable to that harmony between the head and the body, which was never more neceſſary than at this criſis; can all appearances that may foment it, be too ſoon made to ceaſe, even if there was no reality to juſtify the murmur? or can thoſe be deemed very great ſtateſmen who have acted, as if they reckoned for nothing thoſe appearances to the people?

For

For let it even be granted, that thoſe unaccountable, contradictory alliances, huddled up with the Ruſſians, and the king of Pruſſia, for the greater ſecurity of covering Hanover, menaced by France, purely on account of its connexions with Britain, were therefore perfectly right, and befitting the honor and generoſity of this nation to take the province of Germany, under its ſpecial protection, (tho' by the bye, three days afterwards, itſelf ſued for ſuccors from it) yet, can it be ſaid, that the great national points of Britain, did not deſerve at leaſt, an equal ſhow of tenderneſs? Perhaps, it may be anſwered, that in fact, there was no undue preference, and that both were equally as well taken care of as they could be. Be it ſo. But can the people be blamed, if in their ſharp pangs for the bleeding wounds of Britain, they do not feel themſelves intimately perſuaded of it? Minorca ſcandalouſly loſt, America deficiently ſuccored, and whole provinces expoſed to all the devaſtations of fire and ſword, by a barbarous enemy, are appearances that form a provoking contraſt of the ſuppoſed ſlowneſs, and faintneſs of attention to thoſe great objects,

with the eager hurry, and double-diligence of negotiating armies of fifty thouſand men, and building a treaty with another power, on the ſacrifice of an antient ally, and even of a point of great national juſtice: all, to cover that foreign particle of territory.

Now nothing is more known, than that the province of H——, not an age ago, was hardly mentioned in Europe, otherwiſe than amongſt the moſt inconſiderable ones of Germany, under the protection of whoſe laws it remained, ſheltered, and ſafe in its mediocrity: happy! if too *ſignal* a diſtinction of it, had not raiſed it out of that obſcurity, to a degree of notice, more flattering, perhaps, but at the ſame time more dangerous, as being thereby expoſed to every reſentment of the enemies of Britain, to which it ſtands ſo innocently obnoxious, for clogging and diſtreſſing our operations, without its meaning it, and without its being poſſible to be eſſentially defended by us. Had it then been plainly, and uniformly left to take its chance, under the common Bond of the Empire: no Powers would probably have thought it worth while moleſting it, or have made enter into their ſyſtem of policy,

policy, any ſcheme of attacking it, and of wounding Britain through its ſides: and thus being even for its own ſake treated as independent on this nation; the greater ſtrength which would have accrued to Britain from this conduct towards it, would, from the obvious conſequence of power to revenge any injuries offered to it, on account of this nation, have probably more effectually prevented them, than that fond partiality, which could only ſerve to invite them.

That an over-deference then to any connexion on the continent, can but hang a dead weight on the reſolutions of Britain, and deprive it of the ineſtimable advantages of its inſular ſituation, is a concluſion authorized by the very nature of things. Nothing was, by all accounts, more eaſy, or more obvious, than the retaking of Cape Breton laſt year, when Mr. Boſcawen's Fleet was in thoſe parts, had preparatory meaſures been taken for it in any time. The New-Englanders deſired nothing better. Its fortifications were ſtill unrepaired, and the reinforcements from France, unequal to the ſtrength that might have been brought againſt it. That great

Gate

Gate of the avenue to Canada, might then, without any chimerical preſumption, have been in our hands, and if not have diſtreſſed France into a neceſſity of offering a peace, at leaſt at Par, have diverted its enterprize upon Minorca, towards recovering a place, which is the true key of all its poſſeſſions in America, the iſlands not excepted, and has beſides dependent on it, the nurſery of its ſeamen, in the ſame, or rather in a greater degree, than the colliery-trade has that of the Engliſh ones. But what miniſtry would have been tempted to propoſe, or order ſuch a meaſure, that muſt have thereby expoſed itſelf to the diſagreeable, and even dangerous hazard of a furious unpopularity, on its being forced by any exigence of the Germanic ſyſtem to reſtore it a ſecond time, on the maxim, that whenever H——r is pinched, Britain muſt diſgorge?

Yet even this perhaps might be, if not with more ſatisfaction, with more patience at leaſt born, if the true intereſt, or even ſafety of H——r had been effectually conſulted, or any ſacrifice to it had not been made ſo much in vain. But, alas! it never perhaps was in greater danger, than from ſpecifically thoſe meaſures

meaſures which an over-anxiety for it ſeems to have ſuggeſted. Its fate appears now in ſome ſort to be tied to the fortune of a prince, whoſe intentions, if not to be ſuſpected, his procedure cannot but be thought rather of the moſt impetuous, and in the ſtile of riſking all for all. If it may be deemed an over refinement to imagine, that he plays too deep a game, not to play it booty, and that his alliance with a nation (for which he was never before known to have a very great reſpect, and muſt yet have a leſs, from its tame conceſſion of a debt, proved by the moſt clear and ſolemn diſcuſſion not to be owing to him) is purely a trap-treaty; there can however be no refinement in pronouncing it not impoſſible but he may be overmatched, by the number of enemies he has brought on himſelf, ſome of which muſt be implacably exaſperated, and will therefore very little reſpect any dominions and powers connected with him, eſpecially ſince his being very little leſs than put to the Ban of the Empire, by the Imperial Monitories, a circumſtance, perhaps not very ſignificant, without being backed by a ſuperior force of arms, but which ſtrengthens however thoſe arms with a color of authority, that may not want for ſome

influence

influence over other provinces of the Empire, unleſs the Bond of it, and its Laws, ſhould be a mere chimera, or non-exiſtence. Any ſalving Proteſt too of H——r, might but little avail it. The glare of his firſt ſucceſſes then is ſo far from dazzling any but weak eyes, that the greatneſs, and eſpecially the manner of them, are but reaſons the more for apprehending a reverſe for him, in the iſſue of which Hanover ſeems but too much involved, and in which ſurely Britain can have but a very remote, if any intereſt at all: as the diverſion created to France, by a power's attacking the houſe of Auſtria, whoſe intereſts (notwithſtanding a momentary alliance, formed by half-fear, half-pique on one ſide, and great art on the other) are, in the nature of things, directly oppoſite to thoſe of France, muſt indeed be a *diverſion* to it, and ſuch an one as would tempt one to think it had been planned at Verſailles.

As nothing then can be clearer, than that the too cloſe an entanglement of Britain with a province on the Continent, is actually detrimental to both; ſuch a repreſentation might have come with propriety, even from the German miniſters to H——, and as to the Engliſh ones, any concurrence, or even acquieſcence

quieſcence of theirs, in leſs Britiſh meaſures, muſt, to ſay nothing of the injury done to their country, endanger, what they might perhaps conſider more, the ſtability of their own power; and bring on, in conſequence of the clamor of an awakened public, the neceſſity of a reſignation with as ill a grace, as that of a pilot giving up his office, whilſt the ſhip lies beating to pieces on thoſe rocks, upon which his unſkilfulneſs had ſteered her; and in ſuch a condition, who would not tremble to take charge of her?

Miniſters then of ſo ſoft a model, would be left with the leſs excuſe, from the nature of our admirable Conſtitution, being ſuch, as that it gives them that ſpecial advantage, if they either knew it, or did not want the virtue to exert it, of a right of remonſtrance. They are not ſlaves: and there are even ſlaves who have dared to aſſert it. The parliament of Paris, which ſeems to have caught ſome of the old ſpirit that formerly animated Britiſh breaſts, has, in a repreſentation directly addreſſed to the French king, not leſs ſenſibly than virtuouſly, ſtated the fair diſtinction of there being ſuch a thing as "*a loyal reſiſtence*,

" *and a treaſonable complaiſance*," " *une reſiſtence* " *de fidelité, et une complaiſance perfide.*" This is the language of true Patriotiſm, and true policy, a language never but to the ſhame of thoſe who omit it, or but ſo much to the honor of thoſe who urge it, however it may be received, that kings have not it in their power to confer a diſtinction equal to it. Wealth, places, titles, ribbons, can be but a wretched bubble's bargain in exchange for it. Who would not, with a grain of taſte, or good ſenſe, but think it an invaluable ſatisfaction, not to be of a Court where ſuch a language was unwelcome, or where ſuperior merit, and the love of one's country, only expoſed the poſſeſſors to the miniſterial oſtraciſm, or ablegation from that Cabinet, where, for its own ſake, it would be happy that none others ſhould be admitted?

So far however is highly probable, that till that genuine ſpirit is ſeen prevalently eſtabliſhed, not by mere profeſſions, but by clear acts, the Public will not eaſily reſume that confidence, in men of power, which has been broke, by the numerous examples of the popular haranguers and writers, who, the inſtant they had

had carried the point, for which they only harangued and wrote, that of private intereſt, without ſhame, or even keeping meaſures with common decency, turned their backs on that Country, over which the influence they had gained by its truſting them, made them conſiderable enough to be dealt with for the ſacrifice of it: but this is rather too ſtale a game, to think of playing it again with a very good grace: it has ſucceeded too often to ſucceed any more. Nothing then but an entire change of meaſures, a new ſpirit of councils, can re-inſpire the hopes of ſeeing the affairs take a more national, and more favorable turn, and encourage the vigorous, heart-and-hand, co-operation of the whole community towards ſo deſirable an end. Even paſt faults may, by contrariety, prove an admirable guidance to future reparation. A ſhip embayed, or got into the midſt of breakers, nearly ſurrounding her, has no chance for eſcaping, but to tack on the oppoſite point of the compaſs to that which brought her into her danger, and meaſure back her courſe. The ſafety then of the nation, forms at preſent the great, the inſtant, the preferable object. France, fluſhed with her recent advantages, is a power too

alert, too knowing, not to follow her blows, as faſt as poſſible, if but to prevent our recovering breath, and would be glad to ſee us take the change, and the public attention engroſſed by inferior or ſecondary points, ſuch as even would be comparatively the perplexing, diſtateful enquiry into paſt miſcarriages; by which the time of action againſt an enemy, that has the ſword at our throats, would be conſumed in queſtioning perſonages, who, after all, may never have had any heads to loſe, and to whom it would be doing too great an honor, to mix, at leaſt till the danger is over, a notice of them with ſo much higher, and more urgent a concern.

Never then could there exiſt a conjuncture, in which a general plan was more neceſſary to be immediately framed, and digeſted by the ableſt heads of the kingdom, for counter-working the French deſigns, and to be carried into execution by proper hands, without loſing an inſtant. Britain, when once it begins to rouze, and feel its own proper ſtrength, and to depend upon itſelf, has yet reſources within itſelf (and to them alone it ſeems indeed left by its ungrateful and ſeduced allies) capable

of

of holding France at bay, till the powers that ſhall have joined her, may be brought back to reflexion on the certain ruin to themſelves of concurring to the over-aggrandizement of a nation, from which they can expect no return, but that of being ultimately ſwallowed up by it, unleſs they can imagine that the French have changed their nature, or their politics their object. Whilſt again others, who now behold the quarrel, with an eye of indifference, or may have been unwilling to make a common cauſe with Britain, when they ſaw it, by becoming a party on the Continent, forfeiting its proper character of arbitreſs of Europe, in virtue of its inſular ſituation, will probably on obſerving its political conduct reſtored, on the old Britiſh footing, be at leaſt leſs averſe to take part in our defence.

Even the Empreſs-Queen, when recovered from her reſentments of the Pruſſian treaty, to a ſenſe of her true intereſt, muſt behold with horror, the engagements into which they have precipitated her, againſt a nation, to which her family owed more gratitude, than to let a tranſient diſguſt, irrevocably alienate her,

her, and drive her into the arms of an antient enemy, who will hardly fail of making his own uſe of her recourſe to him, for which he is beholding only to a ſudden fit of terror and diſpleaſure. But ſhould ſhe not think in time of repairing her error, and diſintangle from France, Britain may ſafely, and without fear of diſappointment, truſt to the houſe of Bourbon, for the care of revenging on the Houſe of Auſtria, the offence this nation has ſo juſtly taken, at the ingratitude and raſhneſs of its preſent procedure, and yet would be ſorry to ſee it puniſhed ſo ſeverely as it deſerves. In the mean time P—— will probably have a hard taſk to perſuade many of the German Princes, or the whole world in general, that a Princeſs, who but the other day, was even an object of Compaſſion to her very enemies, and weakened by that King's rending from her that important Province of Sileſia, in the very inſtant of her ſtruggling, even for her exiſtence, ſhould ſo ſoon be in a capacity, not only of forming a ſcheme to deſtroy him, which, by the bye, ſhe abſolutely denies, and defies him to the proof, but of ſubverting the liberties of the Empire: One part of the charge may have ſome color,

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the other branch of it too may be true; but can never be ſaid to be probable.

Now as to the procedure of Holland towards us. Whatever may be its motives of indifference, whether an unjuſt jealouſy of Britain, or that fear of France, which can only increaſe the occaſions for it; can the Dutch poſſibly be ſuch enemies to themſelves, or betray their own country to that degree, as to ſuffer the remembrance of a few tranſient and preſently-healed miſunderſtandings, which muſt ſometimes happen amongſt neighboring powers, to overcome the attention they owe to themſelves, of preſerving their permanent conſtitutional alliance, with a nation united to it by the common cauſe of liberty againſt its moſt dangerous invaders, united to it, in ſhort, by all the great points of intereſt, and never divided from it, but on the ſmaller ones, which ſuppoſe an eaſy accommodation, between two powers, neither of whoſe ſpirit is that of conqueſt or invaſion? Can it then treat with ſcorn and indignation enough ſuch infamous inducements, as the French writer, under *their* colors, has deſpiſed them ſo much, as to dare to propoſe to them, as if they were to be caught by

by ſo treacherous, and yet ſo groſs a bait. " *If* (ſays he, Letter 11, Page 22, ſtill ſpeaking in the aſſumed character of a Dutchman) " calm *ſpectators of the madneſs of the Engliſh* " *nation, we reſtrict our* vigilance, *to the hold-* " *ing ourſelves in a ſtate of defence againſt the* " *firſt that ſhould attack us,* ſure *of the* AID *of* " *France, in caſe of an* invaſion *from* England, " *what the commerce of this laſt* loſes, *we ſhall* " *neceſſarily* gain. *It is a river that cannot be* " *turned out of its channel, without its flowing* " *into ſome other ground.* Enriched *in the ſame* " *Proportion as England ſhall be* ruined, *who* " *knows but we may come to be on a* level *with* " *that Power ?*" —— Upon a *level* indeed it would ſoon be with it, if that Power was *ruined,* unleſs that meek, diſintereſted Ally of theirs would, as ſoon as it had concluded with one, piouſly, gratefully, and with its uſual moderation, and good faith, abſtain from adding the ſubjection of the other.

One would think too, that Spain ſhould know France rather too well, to hazard the giving it ſuch an aſcendant over its councils, as to let it drag it at laſt into a war, in the advantages of which it will hardly give it any other

other ſhare, than what it cannot well help, or make any better uſe of them, than to enable it the more to give Law to Spain, in every point that their intereſts ſhall differ; and it is impoſſible but that they ſhould differ, for many obvious reaſons that might be given; but one will ſerve for a thouſand: France is its neighbour, both in Europe and America.

And here to particularize all the States in Europe would be ſuperfluous; ſince there is not one of them but is eſſentially intereſted, in that France ſhould not obtain that predominion it ſo viſibly affects. Was it to gain its ends; was the proper natural influence of Britain on the ſyſtem of Europe, to be loſt, or even but leſſened, it would create ſuch a chaſm in it, as would not eaſily, nor ſoon be repaired, and many of its Powers would have cauſe to remember, with regret, their non-concurrence to the ſupport of a nation, whoſe turn to Commerce diffuſed an univerſal benefit, without even the ſuſpicion of an invaſive ſpirit, and whoſe wealth acquired, and even much more than was acquired by it, witneſs the national debt, was ever chearfully contributed to the cauſe and ſervice of univerſal liberty. Whenever

ever too they come to examine the real grounds of the quarrel now on foot, they will find, with indignation, how groſsly France has impoſed on them in their miſ-repreſentations, and that Britain has ſtrictly done no more than defend itſelf againſt uſurpations that tended to deſtroy the Britiſh Intereſt, to its very foundations.

In the mean time, one ever-memorable advantage muſt accrue, though rather of the lateſt, to this nation, from its preſent ſituation, and that is, a thorough ſenſe of the impolicy of ever interfering on the Continent, beyond that juſt meaſure and reſerve, of which the cool ſolidity of a Queen Elizabeth ſet an example, which Britain would have been but too rich, and happy, if it had always been imitated, or if a foreign influence had not too often romantically plunged the nation into the taking part as a Principal, where that of a powerful arbitrator would have better became, and been ſure to it; and immenſe ſums, as well as ſo much precious blood, would have been ſaved to it, for more valuable purpoſes, than purchaſing the experience of the little dependence to be had on the gratitude of the States and

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Princes of the Continent, which however is not much to be wondered at, when there is ſo little to be had even on their own Intereſt.

But leaving them to that ſelf-reproach, from which not ſelf-partiality itſelf can hardly ſave them, when the ſpirit of true policy returning to them, ſhall add its weight to their own reflections, how little the general conduct of Great Britain has deſerved this deſertion from them; proceed we to that great ſtreſs-point, the preſent neceſſity of the nation taking a thorough, and ſevere review of itſelf, if it would form effectual meaſures towards accompliſhing that great and important end of retrieving the damage it has received, and for which it muſt ſo greatly depend on itſelf.

And in the firſt place, it owes to itſelf the Juſtice of examining, whether the general diſſatisfaction that has gone forth againſt paſſed meaſures, is with, or without foundation.

The advocates for them produce, with great parade, a recenſion of our naval forces, and equipments of numerous ſquadrons, which they do not fail to conclude, with the great

propriety of their deſtination, *fatally* indeed eluded by various events, out of the reach of human wiſdom to have foreſeen, or guarded againſt; but who can help fate? Here, an admiral did not fight: there, an unſuſpected paſſage through the Streights of Belleiſle enabled the enemy to give us the ſlip: Or the vaſtneſs of the Atlantic Ocean favored his dodging us, and getting ſafe into port: all theſe, ſurely not imputable to the Miniſters. Much of this may be true, and yet far from ſatisfactory enough to a Public, too juſt to condemn upon thoſe events, which could not but in their nature be left to Fortune, but withall too diſcerning not to ſee, or rather feel, that with reſpect to the ſum of things, there muſt have been ſome undue preference of intereſts, foreign to that of Britain, a want, or defectiveneſs of a general Plan, a perfunctory acquittal of buſineſs by unſubſtantial forms, a ſlowneſs of reſolution, a non-expedition, a nothing-meaningneſs, a certain faintneſs of management, that muſt all have concurred to afford no better an account of ſuch powerful forces, and ſuch expences, without ſtint or meaſure, as thoſe with which the War was opened; and with which ſo little material has been

been done beyond the confeſſedly neceſſary guard of our threatened coaſt; whilſt every thing elſe appears to have been tardily, or deficiently provided for, as if the Nation had been reduced to ſo low an ebb, as to want ſtrength enough to defend, at once, its center of dominion, and the remoter parts of it. If this laſt was purely the caſe, the next queſtions that occur, are how came it to be ſuffered to ſink into this miſerable condition? What preventive wiſdom has been timeouſly exerted to keep it up to its priſtine ſtate? What alliances have been cultivated on a truly Britiſh footing? How has the political and executive ſtrength of the nation been taken care of? — Seamen it is ſaid, are wanted. The wonder would be if they were not wanting, when the means of raiſing and encouraging them have been ſo little provided for in time, and the manning of the navy, in any exigency, truſted to that falſe and ſilly, to ſay no worſe, expedient of preſſing, which is ſo cruel an injury to that live-bulwark of the nation, the claſs of ſailors. What Father, whether a Seaman or landman, but ought to think it an act of piety to deſtroy his child, rather than breed it to the only profeſſion, in which he would

would be liable to ſuch a ſlaviſh treatment? Can the loſs of a man's liberty, be a reaſon for defending the liberties of thoſe who rob him of his own? or will he not be the leſs a man for it? Nothing can be more true than that War, like Love, endures no preſſed men, They rather ſerve then to ſpread the damp of their own juſt diſcontent, amongſt their volunteer-comrades, than are ever brought to join in their willingneſs, as diſtempers are catching, though health is not. A navy may perhaps by this means, ſometimes procure a numerical, but never an effective complement of men. At ſea then, they have near extinguiſhed by violence the ſpirit of the ſervice: at land it has been ſuffered to go out of itſelf, for want of an application to properly cultivate that martial turn, which formerly made the Engliſh troops conſidered as the moſt excellent ones in Europe, whether as to officers or private men.

Whilſt then the attention of the men of power, ſeems to have been engroſſed by foreign concerns, by borough-jobbing, by ſchemes for ſupplanting one another, or for preſerving their poſts, tho' impoſſible by ſuch a con-

a conduct to be long preſerved, inſtead of taking care of the great national points; can it be matter of ſurprize, or a reproach to the People in general, on ſeeing the honor and intereſts of the nation, conſequently levelled in the duſt, that they are not over-enamored with thoſe from whom they have received ſuch untowardly marks of a tenderneſs for their welfare? or that they repay their preference of their own little private intereſt, with the ſentiments they deſerve? Can they be very grateful for certain unpopular remedies for confeſt abuſes, meant perhaps fairly, but ſo unjudiciouſly contrived, as to be greater abuſes themſelves? Have not they, in ſhort, been ſo fond, of even but the appearances of good intentions, that they have given their whole weight of credit to them, and when they found out the deception, ſeemed but the eagerer to embrace a new one, and ſometimes at the hands of the ſame perſons?

Surely then this undoubted ſpirit of Juſtice ſo tempered with good-nature in the People of England, from which, unleſs under the force of ſome treacherous deluſion, they never departed, and to which they were ſoon enabled

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to return by their natural good-ſenſe, muſt be greatly encouraging to any ſucceſſors that may be to thoſe, with whoſe retreat no fault will hardly be found, but that of its lateneſs.

The Public will then moſt probably make the juſt allowances for the evidently diſadvantageous conjuncture, in which ſuch accepters may come in, and fairly diſtinguiſh between the conſequences of prior delinquencys, either impoſſible, or at leaſt extreamly difficult for them to repair, and thoſe acts purely their own. If their good intentions are cordial, they need not fear Juſtice being done to them. The Heart judges the Heart. There is no one too can be inſenſible, not only of the up-hill labor that awaits them, to regain the loſt advantages over foreign enemies, alert and fluſhed with their firſt ſucceſſes, but of the gainſayings, and oppoſition they will have to meet with from domeſtic ones; from the different opinions, in ſhort, inflexible obſtinacy, and prejudices of thoſe to whom no ſyſtem, however adapted to the Public Good, will be welcome, unleſs it co-incides with, or takes in their own private intereſt, to ſay nothing of the reſentments always following removals,

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and the yet more malignant rage of thoſe whoſe cleareſt revenue, founded on too long tolerated abuſes, muſt ſubſide on the re-eſtabliſhment of that Public œconomy, which under a judicious comptrol, equidiſtant from the vice of either extream, can never be but commendable, but is now an abſolute neceſſity. Such enmities then they need not have much penetration to anticipate, nor much firmneſs to deſpiſe. The ſhame would be not to deſerve them. Folly ever murmurs at the reign of Wiſdom, Villainy at that of Honeſty, and Chaos complains of Order. If too they are really eſtimable themſelves, they will be the cauſe of eſteem to others, who, from thinking theirs worth gaining, will exert themſelves to gain it, and in courſe deſerve that of their country: and they will thus be the authors of all the good done for the ſake of imitating, or of being approved by them. Whereas, it is unconceivable the damage, hurt, and diſhonor reſulting to the Public Service, from ſubordinates deſpiſing their ſuperiors, a contempt which can never grow up without cauſe, and from which there is never any recovering. The little non-expletives then of great Offices, can only ſerve to ſink and degrade the autho-

rity of thoſe Offices, but can never make the awe of them, give a competent ſupplement of dignity to the intrinſic nothingneſs of their perſonal character. Yet, how often has the Public groaned at ſeeing places of the higheſt importance beſtowed on thoſe, whoſe only title ſeemed to be that of the moſt aſſured incapacity for them, and ſometimes, though not quite ſo often, their ſecondaries and ſubalterns choſen by the ſame ſtandard; ſome of whom, and thoſe indeed often the leaſt worthleſs, were pinned on the public, purely to ſave the expence of a private gratification for private ſervice, or even for domeſtic drudgery, and thruſt into poſts they were unfit to enjoy, with much the ſame propriety that Mahomet gave his camel a place in his paradiſe, for having proved a faithful beaſt of burthen to him.

All the hopes then of Britain depend on a ſyſtem of management being eſtabliſhed, in which the Publick Good ſhall have that reſpect paid to it, which no true, even, ſelfiſh policy would ever have neglected. It would be indeed a viſionary utopian ſcheme, to propoſe the excluſion of all private intereſt; but ſo much is certain, that even that can neither be permanent,

manent, or not infamous, that does not take the Public Intereſt along with it. The practical neglect of which, ſo plain, ſo obvious a maxim, is however the very folly, that has deſtroyed by far more nations than ever downright treaſon did. Though, in fact, if may be not intentionally, fools are always traitors, if not to their country, to themſelves, and often to both. The great miſchief then is, when they are ſuffered to diſgrace, or be diſgraced by an eminent Place. For whilſt that worthleſſneſs of theirs, which ſeems the darling privilege of too many of a certain rank, continues confined within that little wretched circle (which however paſſes upon them for their great world) of dependents, to whom they are a property, of flatterers that deſpiſe them enough to flatter them, and of aſſociates with them, from the herding inſtinct of congenial underſtandings; the harm is not much; it is a private ridicule, that even intitles the objects of it to pity: but when this worthleſſneſs is puſhed into poſts of national importance, it grows ſerious, and commences a Public Misfortune. Such a caſt then of parts is, in truth, a greater reproach to the Political Drama, than what the Dutch Obſervator (Let. viii. P. 56.) makes

to our Theatre, for admitting the intertexture of the low-burleſque with our graveſt Pieces. It is certainly enough for fools to be endured at a Court, without giving them great places. The invidious cavil however of that Frenchman, will hardly perſuade a judge of taſte, that our Shakeſpeare is inferior to their Corneille, or Racine, whoſe works carry with them the ridicule of a ſtatuary's exhibiting figures of the antients in the modern dreſs of a Monſieur, or Madame, finely finiſhed indeed with a tame correctneſs, and with all the poliſh, but with all the coldneſs too of marble, and like Harlequin's horſe, wanting nothing but life: whilſt our Engliſh Prometheus has given to his productions all the fire, all the animation of nature, with all its wild diſorder of the paſſions. This little digreſſion, the tribute of juſtice to ſo excellent an author, has however no chance for its paſſing, but under favor of the reflection to which it naturally enough gives riſe, that if Engliſhmen would but do juſtice enough to their own ſound original ſenſe, they might, even in matters of taſte, give law to the French, inſtead of receiving it from them. Whereas, as it is, there is no obſerving without a due mixture of pitty and contemptuous indignation,

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an imitation too common amongſt us of a people, who were never born to be our models, and who yet often are ſo, in points of which the nature, is an aggravation of the reproach of their being ſo; as if a light gale had wafted over to us all their levities, and follies, and a ſtrong one had blown over to them all our ſolidity. Our nations ſeem to have changed characters. The ſtreets, the public places, ſociety itſelf is peſtered with nauſeous ſwarms of Engliſh abortions of French foppery, miſerable copiſts of thoſe airs, grimaces, and follies, of which the beſt amongſt the French themſelves are at length ſo ſick, and ſo aſhamed, as to take a leſs frivolous turn; and whilſt numbers here lick up that refuſe-traſh of theirs, they on the contrary boaſt of owing, of late, to Britain, their firſt notions of improving their Marine, Commerce, Colonies, Agriculture, with other of the chief points that tend to enrich and aggrandize a nation. Their nobles, one may ſay, all to a man, at the military age, take up arms, and, however great their fortunes may be, would hold themſelves diſhonored for ever, if they declined venturing their Lives for their Country: whilſt ſo many of our young fellows of rank keep inglorioufly

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loitering about at home, murthering nothing but time, and taſte; content with their ſplendid campaigns at Ranelagh, or their more dangerous ones, at the Piazzas, or the gaming-table: whilſt again ſome of our lords are ſo like ladies, they think it a good compromiſe never to be ſpoken of at all, "*animæ nil magnæ laudis egentes.*" Thence that apathy to true honor, that ſoftneſs, which ſeems the epidemical malady of the times, and might well be the occaſion, that when a Blakeney bravely defended his Charge, the People ſtood as if aſtoniſhed to find one exception to the prevailing degeneracy, and celebrated him with an enthuſiaſm of applauſe, that does honor indeed to the object of it, but is not the beſt of ſigns for the nation that pays it, as virtue muſt have ceaſed to be very common in it, before it could begin to be ſo great a diſtinction.

Britain then, before its late misfortunes and diſgrace, ſeemed at its laſt yawns, and ready to drop into a profound, and ſcarce leſs than a death-ſleep, but awakened as it is, every thing may be hoped from its being rouſed in earneſt, and from feeling its own natural ſtrength, collected in which, and taking care that

that it be applied to its own proper uſe, it will at leaſt deſerve to retrieve its late diſadvantages and loſſes. They may, in truth, be but paſſing clouds, or black as they are, not incapable of being diſſipated. If that PUBLIC VIRTUE, which uſed to give light to Britiſh intellects, and heat to Britiſh courage, was once more to re-viſit, and with its influence re-invigorate this land, from which it has been ſo long baniſhed and exploded by the combined powers of knavery, folly and dullneſs; things might ſoon wear another aſpect, and France, perhaps, be made to come in for her juſt ſhare of danger and damage in the ſtorm ſhe has raiſed; as well as to give a competent ſatisfaction for treating us as Pirates, to all the Courts of Europe, on the account of an undeclared war at ſea, which itſelf manifeſtly began at land, and for which nothing ſure can be more ſtrongly produced in our Juſtification, than what the Dutch Obſervator (Letter VI. Page 26.) ſo fooliſhly, and ſo unconſequentially quotes againſt us, as an Axiom of the Law of Nations. *Hoſtes ſunt qui nobis, aut quibus nos bellum publice decernimus; cæteri latrones aut prædones ſunt.* "Thoſe "are enemies, againſt whom we declare war "formally

" formally, or who declare it againſt us, all " others are *banditti*, or *land-robbers*." True! they are ſo: and can it be a reproach to the Engliſh, that the French in quality of LAND-ROBBERS provoked that uſage of them as ſuch, which that Law of Nations expreſly authorizes, in that very paſſage of it, ſo pompouſly quoted? Nor will this unmerited reproach then, perhaps in the iſſue of the war, ſerve them to ſhelter under it their perfidious reparation of Dunkirk, a point of ſcarce leſs importance to us than the loſs of Minorca or Oſwego.

But theſe great purpoſes will hardly be atchieved by ſpeeching or by writing only. The Times require more of action than of words; the Stateſman more than the Orator: the Genius of buſineſs more than the parade of eloquence; the talent of which is perhaps of all talents at preſent the moſt uſeleſs, ſince things ſpeak enough themſelves. It may too be the more hoped that the infinite ſuperiority of the nation's concern in the iſſue of the preſent foreign war, will abſorb all thoſe petty inteſtine ones, for power and places, that uſed to be carried on by ſilly cabals, and bandying of words; for

that

that the falſe pathos of mock-patriot rants, is now ſo perfectly penetrated and marked, that its ſtraw-blaze can no longer leave a laſting warmth in the heart, or impreſſions on the head: its captives of a moment, on the firſt reflection, ſnap their chains, not without deriſion and indignation, at the vain attempt to lead, or carry them away. As little too can ſounding big talk, empty bravades, or magnificent promiſes impoſe on true ſenſe, and not rather deſtroy than encourage hopes of the perſons that ſhould uſe them: and, in effect, what do they prove, but little ſolid knowledge of affairs, leſs experience, and no judgment? Would not a nation be deplorably reduced, that ſhould have nothing better to truſt to? Reality then of eſſential talents, can alone now be of ſervice; as it muſt be reality of good intentions that only can give the power of perſuaſion, ſince ſo many repeated abuſes of the confidence of the Public, have made it right cautious how it lightly beſtows it, or ſuffers the pretence to be palmed upon it for the motive. Yet who can complain of ſo juſt a jealouſy, unleſs thoſe, whoſe ſchemes of deluſion it may diſappoint? ſince it impoſes no other condition of its ceſſation, than the amiableſt of all virtues, and the moſt exquiſite of

all pleaſures, Sincerity. Even ſtateſmen then may be tempted to adopt this virtue ſo rarely known amongſt them, on viewing it as a policy, as it affords too beſides an admirable argument for purging the whole maſs of power of any old leaven of corruption that might hereafter corrupt, and ſpoil it. For ſurely, without a thorough change of ſpirit and meaſures, any change of miniſtry here can be of no more ſignificance to the nation, than one, in any ſtate of Terra Auſtralis incognita. Under the influence too of ſuch a deſirable alteration, one might hope to ſee it, as ſoon as properly may be, receive vigor and ſtability, from a conſultation of the clear, free ſenſe of the People, left to its own choice of repreſentatives, without the intervention of that wonderful refinement of modern policy, the being at the pains and expence of breeding rottenneſs in one's own ſupports: which curious expedient is however one, and not the leaſt, of the numerous ill conſequences of conſidering, and treating things in petty partial lights, for want of capacity for that great national one, which ſubmits, at one view, the whole ſyſtem of the State, to that political dart of the eye through it, the commandingneſs of which, is not leſs eſſential to the

the ſtateſman in the Cabinet, than, naturally ſpeaking, to the General in the field.

The repetition too, here, of how pretious time now muſt be, can hardly not be forgiven, on a conſideration which cannot well be too much urged, that ever ſince the fatal loſs of Minorca, the French may rationally enough be ſuppoſed to have been forwarding all manner of hoſtile armaments, eſpecially naval ones, and that too not the leſs effectually, for their affecting little noiſe, or ſhew, till they burſt forth into ſudden execution; to ſay nothing of their meaſures for keeping the ſtart they have ſo ſhamefully gained, by traducing, and out-negotiating us in ſo many of the Courts of Europe. Will it then be any ſurprize to hear next, that we are attacked, by ſome petty part of its forces, in ſome of our iſlands, or perhaps at Cape Corſe Caſtle, and our ſettlements at Guiney, or wherever they may moſt damage the foundations of our trade? Whilſt, on our ſide, what mighty counter-preparations have been carrying on? What, in all this time has been done, beſides Admiral Hawke's (as could not but be beſpoke) braving the enemy, and beating the ſeas, in vain, and at length, now

that the Britiſh home is loſt in thoſe parts, obliged to beg, or force a winter-refuge wherever he can find it?——What too is it, that, to the almoſt loſing ſight and ſenſe of the main point, has chiefly, for ſo many months, employed and amuſed the general attention, but the diſcuſſion of Mr. Byng's Caſe; or the changes talked of to be in the miniſtry? the which, if requiſite to be adjuſted before any plan of vigorous operations could be formed, and put under a ſettled direction, muſt however redouble the neceſſity of redeeming every inſtant thus conſumed: the nation's ſafety, and the moſt effectual manner of acting againſt the enemy, being objects of ſuch capital, ſuch immediate concern, that any points of a remoter importance, or tendency, cannot without the moſt manifeſt imprudence, but give way to them, or, at leaſt, cannot well be wiſhed to interfere with them.

In the mean time it may be a romantic hope, but cannot be an unnational wiſh, that all ranks and conditions of men, ſenſible of the preſent ſituation of their country, ſhould unanimouſly ſtand up in the reſolution of revenging its injuries, and retrieving its intereſts.

This

This is a cauſe that might of itſelf inflame the coldeſt boſom, and reyouthen old age itſelf into vigor for its defence. Such a ſpirit thoroughly diffuſed, would at once animate and impower: it would enlighten the head in Council; it would nerve the arm in Battle. Then it would be that nothing, humanly ſpeaking, need be deſpaired of by this nation, reſtored to itſelf, to its own Genius, and unadulterate intereſt. To conclude: May all private or party-reſpects, ſubmit to the Public Good; and may that ſyſtem alone take place, which ſhall be moſt to the advantage of Britain!

FINIS.

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